Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (working copy) @@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i); return(NULL); } + ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp, long len) { @@ -289,12 +290,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, cons ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *data; - int i; - /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in - * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2 + int i, length; + + /* Sanity check OID encoding. + * Need at least one content octet. + * MSB must be clear in the last octet. + * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2 */ - for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++) + if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL || + p[len - 1] & 0x80) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); + return NULL; + } + /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */ + length = (int)len; + for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++) + { if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80))) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING); @@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, cons data = (unsigned char *)ret->data; ret->data = NULL; /* once detached we can change it */ - if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len)) + if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length)) { ret->length=0; if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data); - data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1); + data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length); if (data == NULL) { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; } - memcpy(data,p,(int)len); + memcpy(data,p,length); /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */ ret->data =data; - ret->length=(int)len; + ret->length=length; ret->sn=NULL; ret->ln=NULL; /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */ - p+=len; + p+=length; if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret; *pp=p; Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c (working copy) @@ -471,12 +471,13 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1 const unsigned char *p; char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2]; - if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) { - buf[0]='\0'; + /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */ + if (buf && buf_len > 0) + buf[0] = '\0'; + + if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0); - } - if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef) { const char *s; @@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1 i=(int)(l/40); l-=(long)(i*40); } - if (buf && (buf_len > 0)) + if (buf && (buf_len > 1)) { *buf++ = i + '0'; + *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } n++; @@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1 i = strlen(bndec); if (buf) { - if (buf_len > 0) + if (buf_len > 1) { *buf++ = '.'; + *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len); @@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err: OPENSSL_free(buf); return(ok); } - Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c (working copy) @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g) int longg ; int longN = BN_num_bytes(N); + if (BN_ucmp(g, N) >= 0) + return NULL; + if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(longN)) == NULL) return NULL; BN_bn2bin(N,tmp) ; @@ -117,6 +120,9 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *N if ((A == NULL) ||(B == NULL) || (N == NULL)) return NULL; + if (BN_ucmp(A, N) >= 0 || BN_ucmp(B, N) >= 0) + return NULL; + longN= BN_num_bytes(N); if ((cAB = OPENSSL_malloc(2*longN)) == NULL) Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy) @@ -586,30 +586,33 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, return 0; } +/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes + * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may + * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */ +static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) + { + unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; + if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list) + return s->max_cert_list; + return max_len; + } static int -dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) +dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; int i = -1, is_complete; unsigned char seq64be[8]; - unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len; + unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) + if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len || + msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; - /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set) - * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum. - */ - if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list) - max_len = s->max_cert_list; - else - max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; + if (frag_len == 0) + return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; - if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len) - goto err; - /* Try to find item in queue */ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8); @@ -638,7 +641,8 @@ static int /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a - * retransmit and can be dropped. + * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag + * does not need to be freed. */ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { @@ -658,7 +662,9 @@ static int /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i=-1; + if (i<=0) goto err; RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, @@ -675,10 +681,6 @@ static int if (item == NULL) { - memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); - item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) { @@ -686,14 +688,18 @@ static int i = -1; } - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. + * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, + * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control + * would never have reached this branch. */ + OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: - if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); + if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } @@ -700,7 +706,7 @@ err: static int -dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) +dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) { int i=-1; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; @@ -720,7 +726,7 @@ static int /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it. */ - if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) + if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) item = NULL; /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is @@ -745,9 +751,12 @@ static int } else { - if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) + if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); + if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) + goto err; + frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0); if ( frag == NULL) goto err; @@ -759,26 +768,31 @@ static int /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i = -1; + if (i<=0) goto err; } - memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); - seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8); - seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); - item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if ( item == NULL) goto err; - pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. + * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, + * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either + * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set + * to NULL and it will have been processed with + * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have + * been discarded. */ + OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; err: - if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); + if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); *ok = 0; return i; } Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c (working copy) @@ -982,6 +982,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else @@ -1172,6 +1179,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; else @@ -1231,6 +1245,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; int field_size = 0; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + /* Did we send out the client's * ECDH share for use in premaster * computation as part of client certificate? @@ -1706,5 +1727,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } - - Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c (working copy) @@ -348,16 +348,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have * to read more records to find out. * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this, - * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade - * attacks. */ + * so we simply reject such connections to avoid + * protocol version downgrade attacks. */ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6) { -#if 0 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto err; -#else - v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; -#endif } /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value * which will use the highest version 3 we support. @@ -364,7 +360,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise * this.... */ - else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) v[1]=0xff; else v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */ @@ -444,6 +440,18 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */ v[1] = p[4]; + /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 + * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS + * record. It's format is: + * Byte Content + * 0-1 msg_length + * 2 msg_type + * 3-4 version + * 5-6 cipher_spec_length + * 7-8 session_id_length + * 9-10 challenge_length + * ... ... + */ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1]; if (n > (1024*4)) { @@ -450,8 +458,16 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } + if (n < 9) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2); + /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have + * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid + * packet bytes. */ if (j <= 0) return(j); ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2); Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy) @@ -953,6 +953,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) && + !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); @@ -1459,6 +1468,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) p+=i; n-=param_len; + if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + /* We must check if there is a certificate */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) @@ -2252,6 +2267,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (working copy) @@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aNULL, + SSL_aSRP, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, @@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aNULL, + SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, @@ -2522,7 +2522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, - SSL_aNULL, + SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL_TLSV1, Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy) @@ -2798,6 +2798,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } + if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 + || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (working copy) @@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ extern "C" { #define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94" #define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01" #define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST" +#define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP" #define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS" #define SSL_TXT_DH "DH" @@ -2309,6 +2310,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350 +#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353 Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (working copy) @@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={ {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, + {0,SSL_TXT_aSRP,0, 0,SSL_aSRP, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ {0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0, SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, @@ -1628,6 +1629,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cip case SSL_aPSK: au="PSK"; break; + case SSL_aSRP: + au="SRP"; + break; default: au="unknown"; break; Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (working copy) @@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH) ,"bad srp b length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH) ,"bad srp g length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH) ,"bad srp n length"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS) ,"bad srp parameters"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH) ,"bad srp s length"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE) ,"bad srtp mki value"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"}, Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (working copy) @@ -1402,6 +1402,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_C s->psk_client_callback == NULL) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) && + !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) + continue; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); p+=j; } Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (working copy) @@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ #define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L /* PSK auth */ #define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */ #define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */ +#define SSL_aSRP 0x00000400L /* SRP auth */ /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */ @@ -1173,4 +1174,6 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra( const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len); +int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al); + #endif Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c (working copy) @@ -1446,15 +1446,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) + if (!s->hit) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; + s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); #if 0 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c (revision 270128) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c (working copy) @@ -408,17 +408,47 @@ err: return ret; } +int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al) + { + SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx; + /* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0 + * by checking B != 0 since B < N + */ + if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >=0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0 + || BN_is_zero(srp->B)) + { + *al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + + if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY; + return 0; + } + + if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback) + { + if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY; + return 0; + } + } + else if(!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N)) + { + *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY; + return 0; + } + + return 1; + } + + int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s) { unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength) - return -1; - - if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL && - !SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N)) - return -1 ; - RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a); OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); @@ -426,10 +456,6 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s) if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g))) return -1; - /* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */ - if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL) - return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg); - return 1; }