Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c (working copy) @@ -420,6 +420,8 @@ int max; X509_OBJECT ret; #endif + unsigned char *tkey = NULL; + int tkeylen; int jj; if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) @@ -461,36 +463,42 @@ if (pcert == NULL) { + /* Temporary storage in case EVP_PKEY_decrypt + * overwrites output buffer on error. + */ + unsigned char *tmp2; + tmp2 = OPENSSL_malloc(jj); + if (!tmp2) + goto err; + jj = -1; + /* Always attempt to decrypt all cases to avoid + * leaking timing information about a successful + * decrypt. + */ for (i=0; ienc_key), M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey); - if (jj > 0) - break; + if (tret > 0) + { + memcpy(tmp, tmp2, tret); + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, tret); + jj = tret; + } ERR_clear_error(); - ri = NULL; } - if (ri == NULL) - { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, - PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY); - goto err; - } + OPENSSL_free(tmp2); } else { jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp, M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key), M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey); - if (jj <= 0) - { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, - ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } + ERR_clear_error(); } evp_ctx=NULL; @@ -499,24 +507,49 @@ goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0) goto err; + /* Generate random key to counter MMA */ + tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx); + tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen); + if (!tkey) + goto err; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0) + goto err; + /* If we have no key use random key */ + if (jj <= 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(tmp); + jj = tkeylen; + tmp = tkey; + tkey = NULL; + } - if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) { + if (jj != tkeylen) { /* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key * and effective key length. The key length is * determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key. */ if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, jj)) { - PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, - PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); - goto err; + /* As MMA defence use random key instead */ + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, jj); + OPENSSL_free(tmp); + jj = tkeylen; + tmp = tkey; + tkey = NULL; } } + ERR_clear_error(); if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj); + if (tkey) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen); + OPENSSL_free(tkey); + } + if (out == NULL) out=etmp; else Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/mem.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/mem.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/mem.c (working copy) @@ -372,6 +372,10 @@ if (num <= 0) return NULL; + /* We don't support shrinking the buffer. Note the memcpy that copies + * |old_len| bytes to the new buffer, below. */ + if (num < old_len) return NULL; + if (realloc_debug_func != NULL) realloc_debug_func(str, NULL, num, file, line, 0); ret=malloc_ex_func(num,file,line); Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_map.c (working copy) @@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ static void policy_map_free(X509_POLICY_REF *map) { - if (map->subjectDomainPolicy) - ASN1_OBJECT_free(map->subjectDomainPolicy); OPENSSL_free(map); } @@ -95,6 +93,7 @@ { POLICY_MAPPING *map; X509_POLICY_REF *ref = NULL; + ASN1_OBJECT *subjectDomainPolicyRef; X509_POLICY_DATA *data; X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache = x->policy_cache; int i; @@ -153,13 +152,16 @@ if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(data->expected_policy_set, map->subjectDomainPolicy)) goto bad_mapping; + /* map->subjectDomainPolicy will be freed when + * cache->data is freed. Set it to NULL to avoid double-free. */ + subjectDomainPolicyRef = map->subjectDomainPolicy; + map->subjectDomainPolicy = NULL; ref = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_REF)); if (!ref) goto bad_mapping; - ref->subjectDomainPolicy = map->subjectDomainPolicy; - map->subjectDomainPolicy = NULL; + ref->subjectDomainPolicy = subjectDomainPolicyRef; ref->data = data; if (!sk_X509_POLICY_REF_push(cache->maps, ref)) Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c (working copy) @@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ case 2: return 1; + /* Some internal error */ + case -1: + return -1; + /* Some internal error */ case 0: return 0; @@ -691,4 +695,3 @@ return 0; } - Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c (working copy) @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include @@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ BUF_MEM *b; unsigned char *p; int i; - int ret=-1; ASN1_const_CTX c; - int want=HEADER_SIZE; + size_t want=HEADER_SIZE; int eos=0; -#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64) - /* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */ - long off=0; -#else - int off=0; -#endif - int len=0; + size_t off=0; + size_t len=0; b=BUF_MEM_new(); if (b == NULL) @@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ { want-=(len-off); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want)) + if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; @@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ goto err; } if (i > 0) + { + if (len+i < len) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } len+=i; + } } /* else data already loaded */ @@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ { /* no data body so go round again */ eos++; + if (eos < 0) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } want=HEADER_SIZE; } else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC)) @@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ else { /* suck in c.slen bytes of data */ - want=(int)c.slen; + want=c.slen; if (want > (len-off)) { want-=(len-off); + if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ || + len+want < len) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA); goto err; } + /* This can't overflow because + * |len+want| didn't overflow. */ len+=i; - want -= i; + want-=i; } } - off+=(int)c.slen; + if (off + c.slen < off) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + off+=c.slen; if (eos <= 0) { break; @@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ } } + if (off > INT_MAX) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + *pb = b; return off; err: if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b); - return(ret); + return -1; } Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c (working copy) @@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ #include "cryptlib.h" #include +/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That + * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures + * that the result fits in an int. */ +#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc + BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void) { BUF_MEM *ret; @@ -94,6 +99,11 @@ char *ret; unsigned int n; + if (len < 0) + { + BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } if (str->length >= len) { str->length=len; @@ -105,6 +115,12 @@ str->length=len; return(len); } + /* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */ + if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION) + { + BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } n=(len+3)/3*4; if (str->data == NULL) ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n); @@ -130,6 +146,11 @@ char *ret; unsigned int n; + if (len < 0) + { + BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } if (str->length >= len) { memset(&str->data[len],0,str->length-len); @@ -142,6 +163,12 @@ str->length=len; return(len); } + /* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */ + if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION) + { + BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } n=(len+3)/3*4; if (str->data == NULL) ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n); Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (working copy) @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL), "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM), "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "SSL3_CONNECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "SSL3_CTRL"}, @@ -375,6 +376,7 @@ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY) ,"missing tmp rsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY) ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"}, Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy) @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ } s->init_num=0; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { @@ -697,6 +698,14 @@ int ok; long n; + /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per + * negotiation. */ + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); + return -1; + } + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, * so permit appropriate message length */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, @@ -725,6 +734,7 @@ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; } #endif + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; return 2; } return 1; Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (working copy) @@ -1739,6 +1739,7 @@ #define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 +#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 292 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 @@ -1974,6 +1975,7 @@ #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173 #define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174 +#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 325 #define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177 Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c (working copy) @@ -479,6 +479,9 @@ /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ l+=i; + /* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten + * with the padding length. */ + memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); rec->length+=i; rec->input[l-1]=(i-1); } Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h =================================================================== --- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 234636) +++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (working copy) @@ -333,6 +333,17 @@ #define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x0002 #define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER 0x0004 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008 + +/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we + * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us + * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a + * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart + * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS + * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to + * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be + * effected, but we can't prevent that. + */ +#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040 typedef struct ssl3_state_st {